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Abstract
The monopolist’s incentives towards product and process innovations are
evaluated against the social optimum. The main …ndings are that (i) the
incentive to invest in cost-reducing R&D is inversely related to the number
of varieties being supplied at equilibrium, under both regimes; (ii) distortions
obtain under monopoly, w.r.t. both the number of varieties and the technol-
ogy. With substitutes (respectively, complements), the monopolist’s product
range is smaller (respectively, larger) than under social planning. For any
given number of goods, the monopolist operates at a higher marginal cost
than the planner does.
JEL Classi…cation: L12, O31
Keywords: multiproduct …rm, process innovation, product innovation
1 Introduction
Firms’ investment in a particular technology is usually linked to the kind and
number of products they want to supply. Indeed, casual observation suggests
that …rms activate R&D portfolios including several innovation projects. Sur-
prisingly enough, this problem has received relatively scanty attention (see
Bhattacharya and Mookherjee, 1986; Dasgupta and Maskin, 1987). R&D can
be carried out along two di¤erent directions, namely, process and product
innovation. To the best of my knowledge, the literature usually treats the
two kinds of innovation separately, a noteworthy exception being Rosenkranz
(1996). Bonanno and Haworth (1998) consider a market for vertically di¤er-
entiated goods where …rms can invest either to reduce marginal cost or to
introduce a new variety. However, they do not investigate the possibility for
…rms to pursue both innovations at the same time.
There exists a wide literature concerning multiproduct …rms.1 The early
studies in this direction justi…ed the supply of product lines on the grounds of
production costs. In the theory of contestable markets (Baumol, Panzar and
Willig, 1982; Panzar, 1989), the existence of multiproduct …rms is justi…ed
by economies of scope.
The role of demand-side factors in in‡uencing the …rms’ optimal product
range has received much less attention, the reason being that the analysis of
this issue can be complicated by the externalities that multiproduct …rms try
to internalise. That is, a …rm has to control competition between products
belonging to the same line, so as to limit cannibalisation as much as possible.
Brander and Eaton (1984) focus upon the interplay between consumer’s de-
mand for di¤erentiated goods on one side, and the strategic and technological
e¤ects a¤ecting …rms’ behaviour, on the other side. Relying on a theoreti-
cal model where the analysis con…nes to Cournot competition, Brander and
Eaton verify that …rms’ strategic decisions as to product range and output
level may lead to market equilibria where …rms supply product ranges char-
acterised by a high degree of substitutability. This result is derived under
the assumption that each …rm’s product range consists in a given number of
varieties, and is therefore subject to a fairly natural critique, namely, that
…rms may endogenously alter the span of their product range for strategic
reasons. This incentive is investigated by Wernerfelt (1986), …nding that the
1For an exhaustive overview of the theory of multiproduct …rms in oligopolistic or
perfectly competitive environments, see MacDonald and Slivinsky (1987), Okuguchi and
Szidarovsky (1990) and De Fraja (1994).
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driving forces are the heterogeneity of consumer tastes on one side and the
cost of product proliferation on the other. The nested logit approach to the
same problem reveals that, in a free entry equilibrium, there are too many
…rms but too few varieties per …rm, and the total number of varieties is too
small, compared to the social optimum (see Anderson and de Palma, 1992;
Anderson, de Palma and Thisse, 1992).
The behaviour of …rms in choosing optimal product lines has been widely
investigated in the address models of product di¤erentiation, under both
monopoly and oligopoly (see Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Maskin and Riley, 1984;
Gabszewicz et al., 1986; Bonanno, 1987; Champsaur and Rochet, 1989, inter
alia). The main issue at stake in this strand of research is the monopolist’ss
incentive to distort quality and quantity as compared to the social optimum,
and his associated attempt at discriminating among customers with di¤erent
willingness to pay for quality. A further issue is product proliferation as an
entry-deterring device (see, in particular, Judd, 1985; and Bonanno 1987).
The theory of multiproduct …rms has evolved along several lines of re-
search, a relevant one being driven by the idea that consumers may bear
switching costs, either real or perceived as such, related to the purchase of
product lines. Consequently, consumers’ brand loyalty can be so high that
they purchase goods from one …rm only, and …rms’ pricing behaviour becomes
quasi-collusive (see Klemperer, 1992, 1995; Klemperer an Padilla, 1997, inter
alia).
Here, I propose in a model which combines technological and demand
factors. My aim is to investigate product and process innovations jointly, in
a monopoly model where the representative consumer is characterised by a
preference for variety, and goods may be either substitutes or complements.
The possibility for the technology to exhibit economies (or diseconomies) of
scope is considered, and the …rm’s research portfolio is driven by the interplay
between scope economies and product substitutability (or complementarity).
The monopoly optimum is evaluated against the social optimum. The main
…ndings can be summarised as follows. Under both monopoly and social
planning, (i) if goods are substitutes (respectively, complements) the …rm
…nds it optimal to produce more than one variety if product innovation costs
are lower (respectively, higher) than a critical threshold; and (ii) irrespective
of whether goods are substitutes or complements, the incentive to reduce
marginal production cost is inversely related with the number of varieties.
The intuition behind this result is that the …rm may increase her own ability
to extract surplus either by reducing marginal cost for a given number of va-
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rieties, or by expanding the product range for a given marginal cost. Hence,
cost-reducing R&D activities and product innovation are used as substitutes
for one another. Finally, (iii) for any product range, the monopolist invest-
ment in process innovation is too little as compared to the social optimum.
Conversely, for any given marginal cost, the monopolist distort the product
range respect to the social optimum. Therefore, the market su¤ers from
distortion along both dimensions of the innovation activity.2
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces
demand and technology. The optimal R&D portfolio of the monopolist is
evaluated in section 3. Section 4 discusses the socially optimal production
plan. The planner’s optimal R&D portfolio is assessed in section 4. Section
5 provides concluding comments.
2 The model
Consider the following monopoly setting. The …rm supplies n ¸ 1 prod-
ucts, each variety i = 1; 2; 3:::n being characterised by the following inverse
demand function:3
pi = max
8<:0; ®¡ qi ¡ °X
j 6=i
qj
9=; ; (1)
where ° 2 [¡1; 1] measure complementarity/substitutability between any
two products. If ° 2 [¡1; 0) (respectively, ° 2 (0; 1]) goods are demand
complements (respectively, substitutes). If ° = 0; goods are independent
of each other and the …rm is a monopolist on n independent markets, so
that the ensuing analysis reduces to verifying the pro…tability of each single
product on its own market.
For the sake of simplicity, I assume that the output of R&D activity is
certain. The total cost borne by the n-good monopolist are:
2A similar approach is adopted by Lambertini and Orsini (2000) in a monopoly model
with vertical di¤erentiation. Also in this case, there emerge situations where the monop-
olist o¤ers too few products at a higher marginal cost compared to social planning.
3This demand structure was introduced by Bowley (1924), and it has been used, more
recently, by several authors (see Spence, 1976; Dixit, 1979; Singh and Vives, 1984; inter
alia).
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² if n > 1;
C(n) = c(k)
nX
i=1
qi + µnF + »k
2 ; µ > 0 ; » > 0 (2)
² if n = 1;
C(1) = c(k)q + F + »k2 ; » > 0 (3)
where:
² c(k) is a constant marginal cost which can be lowered through an R&D
e¤ort k in process innovation. The cost of such activity is »k2; which
entails that process innovation takes place at decreasing returns, with
c0(k) ´ @c(k)
@k
< 0 ; c00(k) ´ @
2c(k)
@k2
> 0 ; c(0) = c ; lim
k!1
c(k) = 0 (4)
² µnF is the cost associated to product innovation up to n > 1 vari-
eties. If µ 2 [0; 1) (resp., µ > 1) we have economies of scope (resp.,
diseconomies of scope). Notice that here product innovation translates
into product proliferation, while leaving una¤ected the degree of sub-
stitutability or complementarity °.
Therefore, the relevant pro…t function is:
¦M =
nX
i=1
24®¡ qi ¡ °X
j 6=i
qj ¡ c(k)
35 qi ¡ µnF ¡ »k2 ; (5)
to be maximised w.r.t. the vector - ´ fq1; :::qi; :::qn; k; ng : I assume that
the monopolist does not practice any form of price discrimination among
consumers. To simplify calculations, without loss of generality I solve …rst
the market problem. Then, I will proceed to characterise the monopoly
optimum w.r.t. the R&D choices.
The …rst order condition (FOC) for pro…t maximisation w.r.t. variety i
is the following:
@¦M
@qi
= ® ¡ 2
0@qi + °X
j 6=i
qj
1A ¡ c(k) = 0 : (6)
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Introducing the symmetry condition qi = qj = q; the above FOC rewrites:
@¦M
@qi
= ®¡ 2 [1 + ° (n¡ 1)] q ¡ c(k) = 0 ; (7)
yielding
q¤ =
®¡ c(k)
2 [1 + ° (n¡ 1)] (8)
as the optimal output level per-variety. The overall monopoly output in
equilibrium is then Q¤ = n [®¡ c(k)] = f2 [1 + ° (n¡ 1)]g : Equilibrium prof-
its, given the marginal cost and the product line, are:
¦M (n; k) =
n [® ¡ c(k)]2
4 [1 + ° (n¡ 1)] ¡ µnF ¡ »k
2 : (9)
The solution to the pro…t maximisation problem of the monopolist is closely
characterised in the next section.
3 The optimal R&D portfolio under monopoly
Maximisation of ¦M (k; n) with respect to fk; ng yields the following result.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the monopolist’s R&D portfolio is given by
n¤ =
° ¡ 1
°
+
[®¡ c(k¤)]
q
µF (1¡ °)
2µF°
and
c0(k¤) = ¡4»k
¤ [1 + ° (n¤ ¡ 1)]
n¤ [®¡ c(k¤)]
provided that
c
00
(k¤) ¸ 4» [1 + ° (n
¤ ¡ 1)]
n¤ [® ¡ c(k¤)] ¢
"
4» (k¤)2
n¤ [®¡ c(k¤)]2 ¡ 1
#
and
F 2
"
0 ;
[® ¡ c(k¤)]2 (1¡ °)
4µ
#
8 ° 2 (0; 1] ; (10)
F ¸ [®¡ c(k
¤)]2 (1¡ °)
4µ
8 ° 2 [¡1; 0) : (11)
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that either (10) or (11) can be satis…ed. Being they mutually exclu-
sive, Proposition 1 entails that, if the monopolist …nds it optimal to produce
more than one variety in the case of substitutes, he will necessarily …nd it
optimal to supply a single good in the case of complements, and vice versa.
As a complement to Proposition 1, the following Corollary can be stated:
Corollary 1 Under perfect substitutability, i.e., ° = 1; the monopolist pro-
duces at most one variety.
Proof. To prove the above result, it su¢ces to check from (9) that
lim
°!1 ¦M(n; k) =
[® ¡ c(k)]2
4
¡ µnF ¡ »k2 : (12)
Namely, when products are homogeneous, the most pro…table strategy
consists in operating a single plant, reducing thus to a minimum the amount
of sunk costs. In connection with this fairly intuitive result, I am now in a
position to characterise the in‡uence of the relevant demand and cost para-
meters fF; µ; °g upon the optimal product range n¤: This is summarised in
the following:
Proposition 2 Consider n¤ > 1; i.e., either
F 2
h
0 ; bF i 8 ° 2 (0; 1]
or
F ¸ bF 8 ° 2 [¡1; 0) ;
where bF = [®¡ c(k¤)]2 (1¡ °)
4µ
: Then we have
@n¤
@F
< 0 and
@n¤
@µ
< 0 8 ° 2 (0; 1] ;
@n¤
@F
> 0 and
@n¤
@µ
> 0 8 ° 2 [¡1; 0) :
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Moreover, for all ° 2 (0; 1] :
@n¤
@°
< 0 if F < bF ; 8 ° 2 (0; 1] ;
while for all ° 2 [¡1; 0) :
@n¤
@°
> 0 if F > bF :
Proof. The e¤ect on n¤ of a variation in F or µ is described by:
@n¤
@F
= ¡ [®¡ c(k
¤)]
p
1¡ °
4F°
p
µF
(13)
and
@n¤
@µ
= ¡ [®¡ c(k
¤)]
p
1¡ °
4µ°
p
µF
: (14)
The sign of both (13) and (14) is negative (respectively, positive) for all
° 2 (0; 1] (respectively, ° 2 [¡1; 0)).
Now examine
@n¤
@°
=
4
q
µF (1¡ °)¡ [®¡ c(k¤)] (2¡ °)
4°2
q
µF (1¡ °)
: (15)
The r.h.s. of (15) is positive for all
F > eF = (2¡ °)2 [® ¡ c(k¤)]2
16µ(1¡ °) (16)
(and, conversely, negative for all F 2 [0; eF )), regardless of whether goods
are complements or substitutes. Therefore,
for all ° 2 (0; 1] : @n
¤
@°
< 0 if F < min
n eF ; bFo ; (17a)
for all ° 2 [¡1; 0) : @n
¤
@°
> 0 if F > max
n eF ; bFo : (18)
To complete the proof, observe that
eF > bF 8 ° 2 (0; 1] ; (19)eF < bF 8 ° 2 [¡1; 0) : (20)
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Therefore, min
n eF ; bFo = bF for all ° 2 (0; 1]; and maxn eF ; bFo = bF for all
° 2 [¡1; 0): This concludes the proof.
The intuition behind the results stated in Proposition 2 largely relies upon
the interplay between scope economies (or diseconomies) and product substi-
tutability (or complementarity), as follows. As economies of scope decrease
or diseconomies of scope increase (i.e., µ becomes larger), the equilibrium
number of varieties shrinks (if goods are substitutes; and conversely if they
are complements). The same holds if unit product innovation costs (F ) in-
crease. Interpreting the behaviour of n¤ as ° varies is also a straightforward
task. I can con…ne myself to consider the case of substitutes (° positive),
as with complements the reverse is true. Here, @n¤=@° is negative when
F is small enough to ensure that n¤ ¸ 1. The explanation appears to be
that as the degree of substitutability increases, the …rm …nds it pro…table
to shrink the product range as it is more convenient to save on …xed costs
rather than to try and extract more surplus from customers through product
proliferation, precisely because the monopolist’s ability to increase revenues
through product proliferation weakens as products becomes more similar to
each other. Therefore, as products become more similar, the incentive to-
wards product innovation tends to vanish, and there remains the incentive
to reduce marginal cost. To this regard, from (38) we have that
@c0(k¤)
@n¤
=
4»k¤ (1¡ °)
(n¤)2 [®¡ c(k¤)] ¸ 0 for all ° 2 [¡1 ; 1] : (21)
Therefore, I can state the following:
Lemma 1 The monopolist’s incentive towards process innovation is decreas-
ing in the number of products supplied in equilibrium.
The interpretation of the above Lemma is immediate. The …rm can ex-
tract surplus either by enlarging ® ¡ c(k¤) for a given number of varieties,
or by enlarging the product range for a given marginal cost. Therefore, the
maximum incentive towards investment in cost-reducing R&D is observed
when a single variety is supplied, as in that situation process innovation is
mostly e¤ective.
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4 Social optimum
The planner maximises social welfare, de…ned as the sum of pro…ts and con-
sumer surplus:
SW = ¦ + CS =
nX
i=1
24®¡ qi ¡ °X
j 6=i
qj ¡ c(k)
35 qi + (22)
+
nX
i=1
(® ¡ pi)qi
2
¡ µnF ¡ »k2
w.r.t. the vector - ´ fq1; :::qi; :::qn; k; ng : As in the previous case, I …rst
solve the marketing problem, given technology and the product range. The
FOC w.r.t. the output level of variety i is:
@SW
@qi
= ®¡ qi [1 + °(n¡ 1)]¡ c(k) = 0 (23)
yielding
qSP =
® ¡ c(k)
1 + °(n¡ 1) (24)
which can be compared to (8) to verify immediately that qSP = 2q¤: Obvi-
ously QSP = 2Q¤; while pSP = c(k): Therefore,
SW SP = CSSP =
n [®¡ c(k)]2
2 [1 + °(n¡ 1)] ¡ µnF ¡ »k
2 (25)
while ¦SP = 0: The socially optimal technology and product range are in-
vestigated in the next section.
5 The socially optimal R&D portfolio
The planners’ FOCs w.r.t. the number of varieties and the cost-reducing
R&D e¤ort are:
@SW
@k
= ¡n [® ¡ c(k)] c
0
(k)
1 + °(n ¡ 1) ¡ 2»k = 0 ; (26)
@SW
@n
=
[®¡ c(k)]2
2 [1 + °(n¡ 1)] ¢
"
1 + °(2n¡ 1)
1 + °(n¡ 1)
#
¡ µF = 0 : (27)
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SOCs are:
@2SW
@k2
=
n
·³
c
0
(k)
´2 ¡ (®¡ c(k)) c00(k)¸
1 + °(n¡ 1) ¡ 2» · 0 ; (28)
@2SW
@n2
= ¡(1¡ °)° [® ¡ c(k)]
2
[1 + °(n¡ 1)]3 · 0 ; (29)
and
@2SW (n; k)
@n2
¢ @
2SW (n; k)
@k2
¸ @
2SW (n; k)
@k@n
¢ @
2SW (n; k)
@n@k
; (30)
where
@2SW (n; k)
@k@n
=
@2SW (n; k)
@n@k
= ¡(1¡ °) [® ¡ c(k)] c
0
(k)
[1 + °(n¡ 1)]2 : (31)
As the procedure and computational details are largely analogous to those
characterising the pro…t-seeking monopolist, without further proof I can state
the following:
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, the socially e¢cient R&D portfolio is given
by
nSP =
° ¡ 1
°
+
h
®¡ c
³
kSP
´i q
µF (1¡ °)
µF°
p
2
and
c0
³
kSP
´
= ¡2»k
SP
h
1 + °
³
nSP ¡ 1
´i
nSP [® ¡ c (kSP )]
if and only if
c
00 ³
kSP
´
¸ 2»
h
1 + °
³
nSP ¡ 1
´i
nSP [® ¡ c (kSP )] ¢
264 2»
³
kSP
´2
nSP [® ¡ c (kSP )]2 ¡ 1
375
and
F 2
2640 ;
h
®¡ c(kSP )
i2
(1¡ °)
2µ
375 8 ° 2 (0; 1] ;
F ¸
h
®¡ c(kSP )
i2
(1¡ °)
2µ
8 ° 2 [¡1; 0) :
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Notice that the threshold
F =
h
® ¡ c(kSP )
i2
(1¡ °)
2µ
(32)
is the value of the product innovation cost below (resp., above) which n is
larger than one when goods are substitutes (resp., complements). As in the
monopoly setting, it is easily checked that the planner produces at most one
good when ° = 1:
Moreover, it is immediate to verify that, for any given level of the marginal
cost, F = 2 bF: Likewise, given k (i.e., given c(k)), it can be established that
nSP > n¤ for all ° 2 (0; 1]; and conversely for all ° 2 [¡1; 0): Therefore, we
have the following corollary:
Corollary 2 For a given investment in process innovation, when goods are
substitutes (i.e., ° is positive), the social incentive towards product innovation
is always larger than the monopolist’s. As a result, the planner’s product
range is wider than the monopolist’s. The opposite holds when goods are
complements.
Now I can compare the social incentive to reduce marginal cost to the pri-
vate incentive of a monopolist to do so.4 This can be done for a given number
of varieties, n, and it summarised by the di¤erence
¯¯¯
c
0
(k¤; n)
¯¯¯
¡
¯¯¯
c
0
(kSP ; n)
¯¯¯
; or
equivalently by the comparison between (33) and (26). The result is stated
in the following:
Corollary 3 For a given number of products, and for all ° 2 [¡1; 1]; the so-
cial incentive towards process innovation is larger than the private incentive.
Corollaries 2 and 3 imply that, with substitutes, we shall expect the mo-
nopolist to produce a smaller product line, at a higher marginal cost than
the social planner, i.e., pro…t incentives distort the monopolist’s R&D port-
folio in both respects, as compared to the social optimum. This conclusion
is reinforced by considering the e¤ect of a variation in parameters fF; °; µg
on nSP ; vis à vis their e¤ects on n¤ as illustrated in Proposition 2.
4Observe that the analogous to Lemma 2 holds under social planning as well, i.e., the
planner’s investment in cost-reducing R&D reaches a maximum when nSP = 1: Hence, it
appears that, under both regimes, product variety is a substitute for productive e¢ciency,
and conversely.
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Proposition 4 Consider nSP > 1; i.e., either
F 2
h
0 ; F
i
8 ° 2 (0; 1]
or
F ¸ F 8 ° 2 [¡1; 0) ;
where F =
h
®¡ c(kSP )
i2
(1¡ °)
2µ
: Then we have
@nSP
@F
< 0 and
@nSP
@µ
< 0 8 ° 2 (0; 1] ;
@nSP
@F
> 0 and
@nSP
@µ
> 0 8 ° 2 [¡1; 0) :
Moreover, for all ° 2 (0; 1] :
@nSP
@°
< 0 if F < F ; 8 ° 2 (0; 1] ;
while for all ° 2 [¡1; 0) :
@nSP
@°
> 0 if F > F :
Proof. See the Appendix.
The interpretation of Proposition 4 is largely analogous to that holding
for Proposition 2, except that the incentives to enlarge the product range are
always higher for the planner than for the monopolist, for all ° < 1: This
can be quickly veri…ed through the comparison of
@nSP
@F
;
@nSP
@µ
;
@nSP
@°
against
@n¤
@F
;
@n¤
@µ
;
@n¤
@°
:
At ° = 1; both agents supply a single good by operating a single plant, so
that the issue of product proliferation vanishes. In such a case, by Corollary
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3, it is nevertheless true that the planner’s incentive towards investment in
process innovation is larger than the monopolist’s.
Summing up, we may expect the monopolist to distort investment in both
process and product innovation as well as output at the same time, and these
distortions obviously interact with one another. In turn, this entails that, if
a regulator introduces a policy aimed at correcting one of these distortions,
this will creates some undesirable feedback on the remaining variables. For
instance, subsidising product innovation (in the case of substitutes) would
cause a reduction of the monopolist’s investment in process innovation, in-
ducing then an output reduction.
6 Concluding remarks
I have evaluated the monopolist’s behaviour along two dimensions of his
innovation portfolio, i.e., the R&D activities towards product and process
innovation. Then, I have assessed the monopoly equilibrium against the
social optimum.
The foregoing analysis reveals that, in addition to the well know output
distortion usually associated with the monopolist’s optimal marketing deci-
sions, the market also su¤ers from distortions along the two dimensions of
innovation, at the same time. that is, the monopolists o¤ers too many (or
too few) varieties, produced at a larger marginal cost, than the planner. The
di¤erent incentives towards innovation characterising the monopolist and the
planner entails that any comparative assessment of the two regimes should
take into account that both product range and technology can be expected
to di¤er across regimes. Consequently, the task for the regulator is more
involved than we were lead to think on the basis of the previous literature, in
that the distortions along both dimensions of the monopolist’s R&D activity
add to the usual output distortion due to monopoly pricing.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
I look for the solution w.r.t. fk; ng of the following system:
@¦M(n; k)
@k
= ¡n [®¡ c(k)] c
0(k)
2 [1 + ° (n¡ 1)] ¡ 2»k = 0 ; (33)
@¦M(n; k)
@n
=
[®¡ c(k)]2
4 [1 + ° (n¡ 1)] ¢
(
1¡ °n
[1 + ° (n¡ 1)]
)
¡ µF = 0 ; (34)
where c0(k) ´ @c(k)=@k: Second order conditions for (33-34) to yield an
internal solution require that the Hessian matrix H [¦M (n; k)] · 0; that is:
@2¦M(n; k)
@n2
=
° (° ¡ 1) [® ¡ c(k)]2
2 [1 + ° (n¡ 1)]3 · 0 ; (35)
@2¦M (n; k)
@k2
=
n
n
[c0(k)]2 ¡ [®¡ c(k)] c00(k)
o
¡ 4» [1 + ° (n¡ 1)]
2 [1 + ° (n ¡ 1)] · 0 ; (36)
where c
00
(k) ´ @2c(k)=@k2; and
@2¦M (n; k)
@n2
¢ @
2¦M (n; k)
@k2
¸ @
2¦M(n; k)
@k@n
¢ @
2¦M(n; k)
@n@k
=
Ã
@2¦M(n; k)
@k@n
!2
:
(37)
Consider …rst (33) in isolation. For any n, the optimal R&D e¤ort in
process innovation, k¤; is implicitly given by:
c0(k¤) = ¡4»k
¤ [1 + ° (n¡ 1)]
n [® ¡ c(k¤)] : (38)
Now consider (34). This FOC has two critical points:
n1 =
° ¡ 1
°
¡ [® ¡ c(k)]
q
µF (1¡ °)
2µF°
(39)
n2 =
° ¡ 1
°
+
[®¡ c(k)]
q
µF (1¡ °)
2µF°
(40)
of which only n2 satis…es (35) for all fc(k); °g. Therefore, n2 candidates as
the optimal product range.
14
Consider (38). Substituting the expression for c0(k¤) into (36) and sim-
plifying, I obtain:
@2¦M (n; k)
@k2
= 4» [1 + ° (n¤ ¡ 1)]
"
4» (k¤)2
n¤ [®¡ c(k¤)]2 ¡ 1
#
+ (41)
¡n¤ [®¡ c(k¤)] c00(k¤) · 0 ;
yielding
c
00
(k¤) ¸ 4» [1 + ° (n
¤ ¡ 1)]
n¤ [®¡ c(k¤)] ¢
"
4» (k¤)2
n¤ [®¡ c(k¤)]2 ¡ 1
#
: (42)
The SOC concerning the optimal number of goods can be quickly dealt with,
by observing that
° (° ¡ 1) [®¡ c(k)]2
2 [1 + ° (n¤ ¡ 1)]3 · 0
is satis…ed for all ° 2 [¡1; 1]:
Now look at the condition (37). This can be written as:
@2¦M(n; k)
@n2
¢ @
2¦M(n; k)
@k2
¡
Ã
@2¦M(n; k)
@k@n
!2
= (43)
=
°(1¡ °) [® ¡ c(k¤)]
4 [1 + ° (n¤ ¡ 1)] ¢
8<:4» [1 + ° (n
¤ ¡ 1)]
h
n¤ [®¡ c(k¤)]2 ¡ 4» (k¤)2
i
n¤ [® ¡ c(k¤)]2 +
+n¤ [®¡ c(k¤)] c00(k¤)
o
¡ 4 ¢
(
[»(1¡ °)k¤]
n¤ [1 + ° (n¤ ¡ 1)]
)2
¸ 0 :
The above inequality is satis…ed for
c
00
(k¤) ¸ 4» [1 + ° (n
¤ ¡ 1)]
° fn¤ [®¡ c(k¤)]g3 ¢
n
4» (k¤)2
h
(1¡ °)2 + °n¤(2¡ 2° + °n¤)
i
+
(44)
¡°n¤ [® ¡ c(k¤)]2
o
:
Finally, note that
4» [1 + ° (n¤ ¡ 1)]
n¤ [® ¡ c(k¤)] ¢
"
4» (k¤)2
n¤ [®¡ c(k¤)]2 ¡ 1
#
(45)
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is larger than
4» [1 + ° (n¤ ¡ 1)]
n
4» (k¤)2 [(1¡ °)2 + °n¤(2¡ 2° + °n¤)] +¡°n¤ [® ¡ c(k¤)]2
o
° fn¤ [® ¡ c(k¤)]g3
(46)
over the whole admissible range of parameters. Therefore, (42) is also su¢-
cient to ensure global optimality.
For the above solution to be economically acceptable, it must also be that
n¤ ¸ 1; i.e.,
[® ¡ c(k¤)]
q
µF (1¡ °)¡ 2µF
2µF°
¸ 0 (47)
yielding
F 2
"
0 ;
[® ¡ c(k¤)]2 (1¡ °)
4µ
#
8 ° 2 (0; 1] ; (48)
F ¸ [®¡ c(k
¤)]2 (1¡ °)
4µ
8 ° 2 [¡1; 0) : (49)
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof proceeds along the same lines as for Proposition 2. The e¤ects
on nSP of a variation in F or µ are described by:
@nSP
@F
= ¡ [® ¡ c(k
¤)]
p
1¡ °
2F°
p
2µF
(50)
and
@nSP
@µ
= ¡ [® ¡ c(k
¤)]
p
1¡ °
2µ°
p
2µF
: (51)
The sign of both (50) and (51) is negative (respectively, positive) for all
° 2 (0; 1] (respectively, ° 2 [¡1; 0)).
Then, we have that
@nSP
@°
> 0 for all F > F =
(2¡ °)2 [® ¡ c(k¤)]2
16µ(1¡ °) (52)
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(and, conversely, negative for all F 2 [0; F )), regardless of whether goods
are complements or substitutes. Hence,
for all ° 2 (0; 1] : @n
SP
@°
< 0 if F < min
n
F ; F
o
; (53a)
for all ° 2 [¡1; 0) : @n
SP
@°
> 0 if F > max
n
F ; F
o
: (54)
To complete the proof, observe that
F > F 8 ° 2 (0; 1] ; (55)
F < F 8 ° 2 [¡1; 0) : (56)
Therefore, min
n
F ; F
o
= F for all ° 2 (0; 1]; and max
n
F ; F
o
= F for all
° 2 [¡1; 0): This concludes the proof.
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